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One-Stop Border Posts in East Africa:  
State Encounters of the Fourth Kind 
 
Across Africa, One-Stop Border Posts are being rolled out as part of a continental/ 
regional integration agenda that seeks to facilitate the movement of people and 
goods. This article focuses on four OSBPs in East Africa and addresses the 
question, firstly, of how far they make a break with entrenched operational patterns 
within government bureaucracies, and secondly whether they represent a distinct 
type of border management regime. The article finds that while there has been 
progress on data sharing in Customs, the construction and management of OSBPs 
reflects the persistence of distinct institutional cultures within each country. 
Moreover, working practices involve practical workarounds which belie notions of 
a paperless border. Secondly, the article finds that OSBPs are unlike other border 
crossings and share some features with airports and seaports in that they have been 
designed to handle both cargo and people. But they differ in that they are not 
heavily securitized and represent co-produced spaces of interaction in which 
transporters and members of the surrounding community have helped to shape the 
organizational patterns. The outcomes fuse an official ideology of service, everyday 
bureaucratic practice and local understandings of ownership. 
 
Keywords: One-Stop Border Posts, Boundaries, Customs, Immigration, 
bureaucracy, trade, freedom of movement, governance 
 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, the role of border crossings in African territorial 
governance has been reconfigured by a conjuncture between large-scale infrastructural 
investments, on the one hand, and regional integration agendas pursued by the African 
Union (AU) and various Regional Economic Communities (RECs), on the other.2 
Together they seek to address the historical legacies of economic fragmentation and, at  
more practical level, to facilitate the unfettered flow of commodities and the free 
movement of peoples along designated transport corridors.3 This investment is 
embodied in large structures, such as expanded port facilities, bridges and highways, but 
also the soft infrastructure that enables data to be collected, processed and shared more 
efficiently.4 The One-Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) that are springing up along Africa’s 
many transport corridors represents relatively low-cost additions to corridor 
infrastructure. In recent years, seaports have attracted the lion’s share of infrastructural 
 3 
investment and will surely continue to do so in the coming years.5 But OSBPs matter 
because they are part of the connective infrastructure that links seaports, urban markets 
and mining centres. Although OSBPs are the subject of countless donor reports, they 
have received very little academic attention.6 In this article, we seek to assess the extent 
to which OSBPs are changing the landscape of border management in East Africa, 
where the East African Community (EAC) and COMESA (the Economic Community of 
East and Southern Africa) converge. 
We aim, firstly, to consider how far OSBPs are able to make a break with 
entrenched institutional patterns. On paper, OSBPs do not simply represent business as 
usual. They involve a different constellation of actors who are enjoined to work in 
unfamiliar ways. We therefore seek to understand what happens when the vision rubs up 
against the reality of a multiplicity of agencies that do not easily communicate or regard 
each other as rivals. Whilst taking institutions seriously, our approach is partly informed 
by an emergent literature on ‘practical norms’ which focuses on the reasons for the gap 
between formal bureaucratic rules and what unfolds in practice.7 We are guided by the 
admission of Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan that ‘practical norms’ provides an 
“explanatory concept”, rather than a precise analytical tool – one whose utility is 
ultimately to be judged against its ability to make sense of empirical realities.8 In a study 
of OSBPs, the picture is especially complex, both because the bureaucrats of two 
countries meet at the border and because a multiplicity of agencies are present and 
jockeying for position. It is not, therefore, purely a matter of how officials interpret their 
own sets of rules, but also a question of whose norms weigh more in the scales. Amidst 
the welter of competing claims, officials from different agencies in neighbouring 
countries come to arrangements – and when these solidify into relatively stable patterns 
we can still meaningfully talk of practical norms.  
Secondly, we pose the question of whether OSBPs may be said to represent a 
distinct site of border governance. Thomas Bierschenk points to the role of governance 
reforms, and in particular New Public Management models, in shaping demands placed 
upon bureaucrats.9 The impact is most apparent in Customs where the creation of semi-
autonomous Revenue Authorities (RAs)10 has been accompanied by selective 
outsourcing and the importation of performance-based management tools. But as the 
work of Brenda Chalfin underlines, Customs officers relate to new technologies and 
associated forms of specialist knowledge, and carve out their own room for manoeuvre, 
depending on where the work is taking place.11 Her research focuses on three sites of 
border regulation - namely the port (Tema), the international airport (Kotoka airport) and 
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the land border crossing (Lomé-Aflao) - and in each case the patterns differ 
significantly.12 Our study points to the further particularities of OSBPs as sites of border 
work. While it is customary to distinguish between airports, seaports and land crossings, 
OSBPs sit uneasily between them. In conception, OSBPs are supposed to mark a 
decisive rupture with the established pattern of land crossings which are popularly 
associated with intimidation, everyday corruption and chronic delays.13 OSBPs are 
intended to actively embody the spirit of cross-border cooperation, whilst upholding the 
rights of citizens of member states. In some respects, they manifest greater similarities 
with airports and seaports. Some of their planned features are clearly modelled on those 
of the modern airport, including counters for processing travellers, but also bureaux for 
changing money, cafes and public toilets. In their handling of cargo, the OSBPs look 
like scaled-down versions of seaports, complete with scanners and cargo holding areas. 
But there is a fundamental difference, namely that the OSBPs are embedded in border 
spaces that are used on a daily basis by local populations. The manner in which people 
and goods mingle at the OSBP would be inconceivable in the highly securitized spaces 
represented by airport and seaports. Although a security imperative would suggest that 
access ought to be strictly limited, OSBP managers are forced to acknowledge the 
existence of local claims to co-ownership of the spaces. Indeed, managers positively 
need local populations to embrace the OSBP to meet their targets. The practical norms 
that emerge in these very particular spatial configurations therefore reflect the ways in 
which border populations make their own preferences known. Here we seek to make a 
distinctive contribution to bodies of literature both on border governance and the social 
life of African borderlands.14 
 This article is based on four years of research on the Uganda-Kenya and Uganda-
Rwanda borders between 2014 and 2018, together with another year of desk-based 
research - most of it as part of the larger comparative AFRIGOS project. We were able 
to follow the evolution of OSBPs from the early days of construction through to 
completion, at least in some cases.15 Four OSBPs at Busia Uganda/Busia Kenya; Malaba 
Uganda/Malaba Kenya; Mirama Hills/Kagitumba and Katuna/Gatuna (both on the 
Uganda/Rwanda border) were selected for closer investigation. They lie on the section 
of the Northern Corridor (see Map) that links the port of Mombasa to Uganda, Rwanda 
and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).16 The crucial significance of this Corridor 
resides in the fact that it supplies the entire sub-region with petroleum and basic 
consumer goods  
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The structure of the article is as follows. Firstly, we begin by addressing the ways 
in which regional integration initiatives have informed the conception of the OSBP as a 
catalyst for change. Much of the description that is contained here is fundamental to the 
construction of the larger argument. Secondly, we consider in greater detail how the 
concept of the OSBP has been operationalized, drawing attention to significant 
variations in the manner in which these facilities have been constructed and managed 
between Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda. In the third section, we turn to the ways in which 
a range of actors have helped to shape how OSBPs are configured in practice.  
 
 
Map: Transport Routes in East Africa – Northern Corridor in Yellow 
INSERT MAP 
 
1. Historical Antecedents: From Regional Integration to the OSBP 
The EAC has gone through successive cycles of integration and dis-integration since 
colonial times, but is now once more in the vanguard of regional integration.17 In the 
decades after independence, African states tended to pursue very similar import 
substitution policies that aimed at building national industries and agro-industries behind 
the protection of boundary walls. Regionalism was one of the casualties of the drive for 
national self-sufficiency. The federations and regional communities that had existed in 
the first half of the 1950s, were but a distant memory two decades later. The winding up 
of the East African Community in 1977 was merely the culmination of this process of 
attrition.18 Over the past two decades, however, the tide has reversed. Structural 
Adjustment reforms of the 1980s and 1990s prepared the way by pulling the rug from 
beneath state industrialization strategies. The subsequent re-engagement with 
regionalism is based on an article of faith that an outward facing strategy is more likely 
to unlock the economic complementarity of African countries. Whereas the African 
Union (AU), which replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, looks to 
the long-term goal of continental unification and the rolling out of the African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the RECs have been more concerned with 
practical measures to forge regional blocs. Since the 2000s, models of regional 
integration have rested on three pillars. Firstly, under the Common External Tariff 
(CET), goods produced outside a given community are supposed to be taxed only once 
at the port of entry according to internationally recognized Customs values.19 Secondly, 
there is supposed to be a free flow of commodities within a designated Single Customs 
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Territory (SCT), subject to any specific concessions that member states may have 
extracted. While individual RECs have sought to remove the tariff barriers between 
states, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has begun to 
take shape as a free trade area spanning East, Central, Southern Africa and the Horn.20 
And thirdly, the RECs have committed themselves to the principle of freedom of 
movement and labour for citizens of member states, which in the case of the EAC is 
enshrined in the 2009 Common Market Protocol.21 
Lurking beneath the apparent tidiness of the package, however, are manifold 
tensions as the larger states weigh the benefits of closer integration against some of the 
perceived downsides. Hence South Africa stands to benefit from freer access to other 
African markets, but is concerned about immigration flows. Nigeria is worried about the 
influx of cheaper Chinese manufactures and South-East Asian rice into the sub-region.22 
In East Africa, where there is equally a protectionist tendency,23 countries have 
exploited two specific loopholes: the right of countries to apply for duty-free inputs for 
industries that plan to export and the right to apply for ‘stays of application’ on 
particular goods.24 Tanzania has restricted agricultural exports on grounds of food 
security, whilst protecting its own industries through exemptions.  By contrast, Uganda 
and Rwanda have limited industrial capacity and depend on the supply of petroleum and 
consumer goods by road. Not surprisingly, it is at the borders themselves that many of 
these tensions play themselves out.  
Both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) have championed shared border management as fundamental to boosting trade.25 
The rationale is that the cost of conducting trade within Africa and with the world 
beyond is increased by innumerable delays associated with transporting goods.26 The 
broad principles of a shared border crossing have been operational in parts of Europe 
since the 1950s and early 1960s – most notably on the Franco-Swiss border and in the 
Nordic countries.27 The OSBP concept represents a distillation of some of the 
experiences of joint border management. Iterations have surfaced in Latin America at 
about the same time as the model has travelled to Africa.28 Inevitably, however, OSBPs 
in Africa have developed some specificities of their own, while there are marked 
regional differences - for example, as between West and East Africa. If there is a 
travelling model, it is one that is apparently flexible enough to accommodate significant 
variations. 
 
The What and the Where of OSBPs 
 7 
The EAC was inaugurated in 2000 and implemented a Customs Union Protocol in 2005, 
followed by a Common Market Protocol in 2010 and with Monetary Union expected to 
follow.29 Central to the EAC strategy has been the promotion of OSBPs along the two 
main transport corridors, namely the Northern and Central Corridors that start at 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam respectively. Once commodities have been cleared by the 
Customs officers of the destination country at the port of entry, trucks are supposed to be 
sealed and ideally to remain unopened until they arrive at their final destination. A major 
step forward has been the introduction of an Electronic Cargo Tracking System (ECTS) 
which became operational between Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda in 2017. Removing 
unnecessary checkpoints along the corridors is something that member states are 
formally committed to. But because border crossings often represent very narrow 
apertures – indeed they were historically chosen for precisely that reason – lengthy 
queues have posed a recurrent problem. This impacts upon passengers as much as cargo. 
Rather than having vehicles stop at the point of exit and again at the point of entry, the 
rationale is that Customs and Immigration formalities for both countries ought to take 
place only once at the point of entry. There are three variants of the OSBP: a facility that 
itself straddles the border; one that is located in one country but is used by both sides; 
and juxtaposed facilities that house personnel from both countries.30 In East Africa and 
Southern Africa, juxtaposition is the dominant pattern, although there are examples of 
the second variant in West Africa.31 At the receiving facility, officials of the 
neighbouring countries are supposed to work alongside one another, enabling the rapid 
processing of goods and people according to the regulations governing trade and 
migration. For citizens of member countries in East Africa, national identity cards now 
suffice for the crossing of borders, and an Interstate Pass permits a period of residence 
for up to three months. It also enables citizens to apply for the right to work and study 
for longer periods.32  
As early as 2002, Kenyan and Ugandan agencies at Malaba - by far the busiest 
border crossing on the Northern Corridor - entered into talks with a view to harmonizing 
their procedures.33 This culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
and the commissioning of a feasibility study in 2004.34 In 2006, operations were 
launched based on the piloting of six sensitive commodities. In 2008, petrol tankers were 
permitted to enter Uganda for the first time without stopping on the Kenya side, and in 
that same year the border was opened on a twenty-four-hour basis. Hence Malaba may 
fairly be regarded as one of the first operational OSBPs in sub-Saharan Africa – slightly 
behind Chirundu on the border between Zimbabwe and Zambia which became a partly 
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operational OSBP in 2007.35 However, it was only in 2010 that the East African 
Legislative Assembly passed the enabling legislation through an OSBP Act.36 In 2012, a 
follow-up to the legislation listed 15 OSBPs targeted for implementation across the EAC 
including the four that concern us (Table 1). From this point onwards, a variety of 
donors including the World Bank, the European Union, the Japan International Co-
operation Agency (JICA), the United Kingdom and Canada contributed to the funding of 
particular OSBPs, alongside financing that was committed by the governments of the 
member states. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), a non-profit organization, assumed 
responsibility for channelling funding into infrastructure and information systems in no 
fewer than 13 of the slated OSBPs.37 Those in Busia, Malaba and Mirama 
Hills/Kagitumba were all TMEA projects.38 TMEA has also taken the lead in 
assembling the data on processing times in association with the various RAs and the 
Transport Observatory of the Northern Corridor Transit and Transportation Coordination 
Authority. 
 
Table 1: Planned OSBPS in East Africa, 2012 
INSERT TABLE 
Source: Schedule to ‘East African Community One Stop Border Posts Bill, No. 9, 2012’, p.25 
 
Diagram: Plan of Busia OSBP 
INSERT PICTURE 
 
2. OSBPs as Instruments of Institutional Change 
As of 2018, the OSBPs had reached very different levels of completion. Busia and 
Mirama Hills/Kagitumba were fully operational. At Malaba, a bridge had been 
completed, but access roads continued to pose logistical difficulties. In Katuna/Gatuna, 
construction work on the Uganda side had been suspended indefinitely in 2017, although 
the work was finally completed in 2019. The uneven picture reflects the interplay 
between three factors: namely, the range of institutional actors; the volume of the 
existing traffic flow which has impacted on the construction of roads and buildings; and 
the difficulty of the terrain. 
One of the striking features of the OSBPs in East Africa is how differently they 
have turned out. The Ugandan OSBPs at Malaba, Busia and Mirama Hills are very 
similar in design (see Diagram), as is true of the structure on the Rwandan side at 
Kagitumba. In each case, there is a generous allocation of space for Customs and 
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Immigration, in which personnel from the two countries can easily work alongside each 
other. In addition, there are offices for all the other agencies such as Bureau of 
Standards, Plant Health, Police and Interpol. In the case of the two Kenyan OSBPs, by 
contrast, the facilities seem scarcely adequate for the task – and this seems likely to 
remain the case even when construction work is fully completed. In Busia, very few new 
structures were planned with the exception of an administrative block for the Kenya 
Revenue Authority (KRA). At Malaba in 2017, there were new buildings, but the 
allocation of space was counter-intuitive: while Immigration officers from Kenya and 
Uganda were crammed into a small office, Kenya Bureau of Standards (KeBS) and Plant 
Health (KEPHIS) enjoyed much more generous allocations. Moreover, Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA) and KRA officials did not sit alongside each other as was intended. 
This was apparently not regarded as a priority because Kenya receives relatively few 
imports and little transit trade from its neighbours. At Malaba, the KRA did not even 
check most of the vehicles that cross from Uganda in the belief that verification was best 
done at the port of Mombasa.  
The constellation of institutional actors was a major determinant of the outcomes. 
In the case of Uganda and Rwanda, the intention was to construct purpose-built facilities 
from scratch, making full use of the donor funding that was available.39 In the case of 
Kenya, there was a preference for adding structures onto the buildings that already 
existed. This is curious because in Busia, the structures were already deemed inferior to 
those on the Ugandan side.40 Modifying buildings that were constructed for a different 
purpose has turned out to be a challenge, and appears to be a fundamental reason why 
the operational anomalies in Busia-Kenya persist. This is related to a second factor. In 
each country, it was the agencies involved in border management that were expected to 
come up with the specifications for the OSBP that conformed to their requirements. 
Whereas URA had been given the lead and was able to drive the process in Uganda, 
KRA seemed to have lacked the same institutional clout. The untidy compromises in 
Kenya culminated in plans which, as noted by some informants, did not seem to be 
infused with the philosophy underpinning the OSBPs. In addition, the different agencies 
in Kenya forged ahead with their own individual priorities within the facility rather than 
acting in a co-ordinated fashion.41 There is also a striking difference between the 
trajectory of the OSBPs on the Uganda-Rwanda border. Whereas Mirama 
Hills/Kagitumba was completed in good time, work on the Katuna/Gatuna OSBP ground 
to a halt. The logistical challenges of constructing an OSBP on the Uganda side led to 
escalating costs and disputes with the contractors. Much the same occurred in Rwanda 
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where construction required cutting away part of the hill. The greater challenges posed 
by the terrain was clearly a factor, but it was also less easy to co-ordinate between 
government agencies in the absence of a body like TMEA that exercised overall 
oversight. In that sense, the reasons for the setbacks were institutional as much as 
logistical. The consequences have been profound given that the Katuna/Gatuna crossing 
provides the shortest route to Kigali. Between July 2017 and June 2018, a mere 17,336 
vehicles passed each way through Mirama Hills/Kagitumba, despite the state-of-the art 
OSBP, whereas 90,895 vehicles continued to struggle through Katuna/Gatuna.42 
Moreover, as soon as inter-state politics intruded over 2019, in the shape of heightened 
tensions between the Museveni and Kagame regimes, the obstacles ceased to be 
amenable to local solutions. As of March 2019, the Ugandans were still using their own 
buildings, and Katuna/Gatuna was still not functional as an OSBP.43 
Where OSBPs have been realized, there is good evidence that significant strides 
have been taken toward minimizing the obstacles to the free movement of goods and 
people. The reconstruction of the main arterial roads and the reduction in the number of 
checkpoints has helped to reduce overall journey times. But the OSBPs have played a 
catalytic role in their own right. In 2014/15, TMEA estimated that the turnaround time 
for trucks plying the corridor between Mombasa and Kampala had reduced from 18 to 4 
days and that cargo clearance times had reduced on average from 2 days to 8 hours for 
fuel and from 3 days to 12 hours for other commodities.44 In the case of transit goods 
that enter the port at Mombasa, the Customs declaration is made by clearing agents in 
the destination country. It is processed by the RAs and the duties paid before the 
vehicles even begin to move. The presence of URA and Rwandan Revenue Authority 
(RRA) officials at Mombasa has facilitated the process. As was noted above, when 
trucks in transit are sealed they should remain unopened to the country of destination. In 
practice, whether there is physical verification depends on a combination of elements 
that are identified by the computer system as part of a risk analysis: the country of 
destination; the nature of the goods; whether the cargo attracts high duty; who the 
clearing agents are; whether the goods are destined for warehousing, direct use or are in 
transit; and whether the owner is deemed compliant. The last of these is the most 
important consideration. Vehicles in Uganda and Rwanda are given a colour-coding – 
from green, through blue and yellow to red – and a relatively modest number of vehicles 
are subjected to inspection.45 In most cases, the trucks undergo only a sighted inspection 
– focusing on the vehicle registration, trailer registration, container number and 
verification that the seal is intact – before being allowed to proceed on their way. With 
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effect from August 2018, a significant change at Busia-Uganda is that all trucks entering 
from Kenya pass through a cargo scanner. 
All of this has made a difference to processing times. At Malaba, the average time 
between the arrival and departure of a truck fell from 7.47 hours between April and 
September 2015 to 5.48 hours between October 2015 and March 2016.46 In Busia, the 
crossing time went down from 14.20 to 3.40 hours between 2011 and 2017.47 In 2014, 
we observed that the queue of vehicles at Busia and Malaba stretched for miles, but in 
2016, 2017 and 2018 scarcely any trucks were backed up, even at peak times. However, 
the exception comes when the computer system crashes and the officers have to wait for 
it to return before resuming their duties. Although Customs officers indicated that this 
happened a couple of times a week, one of the drivers we spoke to suggested that it was 
a more regular occurrence. In the case of passenger vehicles, the turnaround times are 
rapid. Passengers conduct Immigration formalities for the country they are leaving and 
then move sideways to the booth of the country they are entering. The entire process is 
not expected to take more than 20 minutes. Long-distance buses at Mirama 
Hills/Kagitumba that travel between Kigali and Kampala set aside an hour in case there 
are goods to be declared at the Baggage Hall – although recent border closures have 
since reduced the flows.  
 
Differing Institutional Patterns 
The differences in the institutional arrangements are also apparent in the manner in 
which the OSBPs actually function. In Uganda, the URA is responsible for the 
management of the facilities, but it also has a position of de facto command over the 
other agencies, including security at the border. Although the Police remain distinct 
from Customs, the URA co-opts its ‘best’ officers into the Customs Police that come 
under the control of the officer in charge of the station.48 In Rwanda, the command 
structure differs from one OSBP to the next. At Kagitumba, it is the senior Immigration 
officer that is responsible, whereas at Rusumo on the Tanzania border it is the RRA that 
takes the lead.49 In Kenya, it is the KRA that is nominally in control, but in practice 
Immigration and Police act with considerable autonomy. Again this has practical 
consequences. Although the URA and the KRA were given vehicles by JICA to enable 
them to carry out joint border patrols, the system broke down at Busia for the most 
fundamental of reasons: whereas the URA officer could grant the authority for KRA 
officers to enter Uganda, the KRA officer was not empowered to reciprocate. The end 
result was that the two sides reverted to independently patrolling their side of the 
 12 
borderline.50 URA officers also pointed to the greater presence of the Police in Kenya 
who are the first point of contact for those entering that country. They seemingly take 
their orders from the District police headquarters and not from the KRA station 
managers. Under the new Kenya Constitution, the County Commissioner wields 
considerable power and this is reflected in their influence over the operations of the 
OSBPs.51 There is some irony to all of this, in that while the Ugandan and Rwandan 
governments are generally regarded as more security conscious, they appear to have 
embraced the operational autonomy of the RAs to a far greater extent than their 
counterparts in Kenya. There, the jockeying for position between different agencies has 
resulted in less coherence in border management. In sum, the existence of OSBPs as 
shared regulatory spaces has not transformed the distinct institutional patterns between 
neighbouring countries. Indeed, the latter have conditioned the ways the OSBPs operate 
in practice. 
 
Paper, Paper, Paper 
Aside from the challenge of harmonizing legal instruments and bureaucratic procedures, 
the greatest issue facing the regional integration agenda in general, and the OSBPs in 
particular, is that of creating data management systems that can speak to one another. 
Alongside the provision of desks and computers to the OSBPs, there has been donor 
support for upgrades to the systems that enable the agencies to carry out their functions. 
The task of integrating information systems involves interventions at two levels: firstly, 
the creation of a mechanism for sharing information between agencies in a given 
country, and secondly a framework for enabling information to flow between agencies 
across borders. Single Window provides a computerized platform for integrating the 
work of agencies within each of the countries, and is part of a global trend. In fact, 
versions of Single Window have only recently been adopted by the EU, Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).52 In 
the EAC, all countries are using it in some form. Hence, KRA officers in Busia can 
check online whether a permit has been issued by KeBS before agreeing to process a 
consignment of goods. However, a greater issue concerns the systems used by the 
Customs authorities across their common borders. Whereas Uganda and Rwanda deploy 
systems based on ASYCUDA World, Kenya has been wedded to SIMBA, and Tanzania 
uses TANCIS.53 Because SIMBA is not web-based, it has been necessary for records 
created in ASYCUDA World to be manually re-entered into SIMBA.54  
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During interviews in 2016, there was a divergence of opinion as to how far the 
different Customs systems were compatible. Whereas it was often claimed there was no 
problem with sharing records, a number of officials at the Uganda-Kenya border 
maintained that were actually incompatible – resulting in countless phone calls and face-
to-face meetings when the officials were not physically seated next to each other. In 
between lie more nuanced assessments about what happens when humans and 
technology collide. A URA official remarked that he was able to read records generated 
in SIMBA whereas his Kenyan colleagues claimed that they were unable to access 
records made in ASYCUDA. His opinion was that this was less a matter of clashing 
technologies than the reluctance of KRA to modify some of its entrenched practices. In 
one case, we were told that some 200 trucks had ‘disappeared’ in the process of crossing 
the border at Busia. As often happened when there were technical difficulties, the matter 
could only be resolved by manually comparing records. In significant ways, the very 
existence of the OSBP forces officials to come up with practical workarounds that are 
familiar from the literature on practical norms. This is true of Customs, but there is also 
increasing pressure on other agencies, such as the Bureaux of Standards, to harmonize 
their procedures. By 2018, the operational glitches within SIMBA, relating to firewalls, 
had apparently been resolved. However, the Kenya government had already confirmed 
its decision to move to its own web-based Integrated Customs Management System 
(ICMS), with assistance from TMEA, the previous year.55 The expectation was that 
when the new system became fully operational it would greatly enhance compatibility 
between Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.  
What is nevertheless striking is the amount of paper that continues to be generated. 
At one point in 2016, we witnessed computer documents - presumably of Ugandan 
origin - being entered into ledgers and then re-entered into the computer system by KRA 
officials. The URA officer who remarked that in Kenya it was all “paper, paper, paper” 
was putting his finger on the stubborn persistence of routines that sit uneasily alongside 
the goal of a fully integrated and paperless world. There is often an enduring trust in 
paper, which leaves a distinct trail in the shape of stamps and signatures, whereas 
electronic documents are more limited in what they reveal and retain. But there are other 
reasons for the persistence of paper. One is that when the power or IT systems fail, there 
is a need to revert to paper to avoid long delays. Although Customs procedures are now 
formally paperless, it is still necessary to print versions of the manifests. The drivers 
need physical documents with stamps in order to process through the numerous weigh-
stations and checkpoints en route. While the OSBPs have eliminated the scope for 
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administrative malpractice at the physical border, the problem has been displaced to 
other points along the corridor. Hence transporters complain of weigh stations that are 
configured to delay and catch drivers out, and of Police roadblocks, especially in Kenya, 
where bribes are routinely demanded.56 Without detailed paperwork, the drivers would 
be even easier prey. The anomalies on the road that are part of the daily experience of 
those engaged in long-distance transportation further underline the limits of the OPSBs 
as instruments of institutional transformation. While RA officers have to some extent 
been incentivized, the Police derive little benefit from facilitating flows along the 
corridors.  
 
3. OSBPs as a Fourth Space 
 
I pledge to offer superior customer care and not to engage in corrupt practices. I will be a 
team player.57 
 
As Bierschenk observes, the importation of management techniques has led to layering 
of norms and the creation of ‘islands of efficiency’.58 The RAs have been a particular 
focus because of their centrality to the fiscal wellbeing of the state. But the impact of 
reforms varies greatly depending on where Customs work is actually transacted because 
the range of actors and the spatial configurations diverge. At a busy port enclave like 
Mombasa, significant inefficiency and corruption is tolerated as long as goods keep 
moving. At ordinary land crossings, border officials are subjected to minimal scrutiny 
and receive little financial incentive. As Titeca and De Herdt indicate for Arua, URA 
officers come to an accommodation with local traders that benefits both parties.59 
OSBPs share elements of each because they are border crossings, but they are also 
critical transport nodes. RA officers are under pressure to simplify procedures, maximize 
revenues and seek a more collaborative relationship with ‘users’. The new language of 
service which is a feature of seaports,60 has become ubiquitous at the OSBPs as well. 
Within URA, a great deal of emphasis is placed upon instilling pride in performance of 
one’s job, but also in nurturing a ‘customer-oriented’ work ethic. At the URA border 
posts, officers append their signature to a notice board on which a service pledge is 
emblazoned. At one OSBP, officers had also written personalized messages on pieces of 
paper that were appended to the wall. The mechanisms for making complaints are less 
obvious, but information desks do perform this function and there are physical 
‘complaint’ boxes in some offices. Maintaining a sunny disposition is a challenge where 
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URA officers, working in four shifts, may process upwards of 1,000 cargo trucks in a 
day and all in a context of chronic under-staffing. The imported, and much-touted, 
management technique that has been deployed to improve the performance of Customs 
is the Balanced Scorecard, with its four ‘perspectives’: Financial, Customer, Business 
and Innovation/Learning.61 Each year, a set of targets for each perspective cascades 
down from Kampala to the revenue stations (including the OSBPs) and from there to 
individual employees. At an OSBP, meeting the financial target might make up as much 
as 60 per cent of the total score, but this indicator includes trade facilitation activity 
alongside revenue collection.62 Crucially, the stations and individuals need to score 
highly on the customer experience and are judged according to the regularity and quality 
of their engagement. Where representatives stay away from monthly meetings or raise 
complaints, this counts negatively on the scorecard. An example came in 2017 when 
Freight Forwarders at one OSBP felt affronted by the introduction of Customs self-
declarations that threatened to put them out of work. They raised their concerns with the 
station manager who felt the need to listen closely for fear of provoking a negative 
response. Although the monitoring of performance at the OSBPs is intended to 
incentivize officers, it can also involve sanctions in the event of under-performance.  
Negotiating with those who transport goods is an everyday preoccupation for 
Customs officers. But they also have to actively engage with the local community. 
Along both sets of borders, it is common knowledge that there is a vigorous small-scale 
trade that bypasses the official crossing points – along what are known as panya routes. 
It is very easy at Busia and at Katuna/Gatuna to observe people transporting goods along 
these paths in broad daylight. Much consists of food crops which may have been 
purchased in local markets, but there are others that attract duty. The Bank of Uganda 
and the Bureau of Statistics seek to enumerate the small-scale trade along the various 
borders, on the basis of two-weekly surveys. These confirm that the overall value of 
informal trade is not inconsiderable.63 In Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, the RAs have 
sought to lure more of this trade into official channels. Border officials seek to 
‘sensitize’ local traders to the fact that much of what they transport does not carry duty 
and runs the risk of seizure and fines. The persistence of panya trading is typically 
explained with reference to some combination of ignorance and a fear of authority. 
Invoking a concrete example, the URA station manager at Busia in 2016 explained that 
fish traders generally avoided the border post for fear of being taxed.64 At a meeting, the 
traders explained that they already paid so many fees and charges that adding a 
government duty on top would render their work unprofitable. The manager responded 
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by pointing to practical ways in which most of the existing charges could be dispensed 
with. The URA set an upper limit on the loads that could be carried at minimal rates of 
duty and agreed to process the Customs returns directly, thereby dispensing with the 
need for clearing agents. It also withdrew policemen from key routes who were 
suspected of extorting money. Subsequently, a steady stream of fish traders could be 
observed crossing with their loads balanced precariously on bicycles and generally 
avoiding eye-contact – in part it seems because a number are testing the limits by 
transporting more than the agreed maximum load. The fact that they were using the 
crossing at all was taken by the station manager as a vindication of the strategy for 
engaging small traders. URA officers needed to allow a certain amount to go 
‘undetected’ in order to maximize usage of the facility – an example of practical norms 
in action.  
The preferred method of engagement has been to encourage the traders to establish 
formal associations, or co-operatives, that are registered by the Ministries of Trade in the 
countries concerned. At Kagitumba, for example, there is an association of Rwandan 
maize-flour traders with a membership of some forty individuals who transport their 
goods in convoys of bicycles. Although these associations are country-specific, there 
seems to be a close relationship between them. They are also invited to participate in the 
regular cross-border meetings that are convened by the two sets of authorities and that 
feed into the performance evaluations. Their role is a dual one: on the one hand, they are 
expected to convey to small-traders the importance of using the designated crossing 
points; on the other hand, they are able to make some representations of their own. An 
additional mechanism has been the creation of information desks that work alongside 
Cross-Border Trade Associations. These disseminate information to small-scale traders, 
assist with documentation and occasionally channel complaints. While all the desks are 
manned by unpaid volunteers who continue to trade independently, the practices vary. In 
Uganda they have received training as well as computers from COMESA, while in 
Kenya they have received free office space at the OSBP but no training or equipment. A 
specific function of the information desks is to hand out the ‘Simplified Certificate of 
Origin’ form which enables small-scale traders to pass Customs without recourse to 
clearing agents who were alleged to fleece them in the past. In some other borders, these 
forms are handled by Customs officials, but in either event the expressed intention is to 
offer a better deal to small-traders. From the perspective of the authorities, formalization 
captures some of the trade that ought to be declared as well as furnishing more robust 
statistical data. For Customs officers at the OSBPs, it actually creates more work and it 
 17 
reduces any additional income that could be made from taking bribes along the panya 
routes. But crucially, it enables officers to meet their targets and provides visible 
evidence that the facilities are actually being used. For the traders, moving through the 
OSBP underlines their claims to co-ownership of the space and forms part of a larger 
negotiation. 
The efforts to curb trade along the panya routes also translates into targets for 
those working in the preventive branch. At Busia-Kenya, one official noted that the 
system of paying informants was well-established, but that officers often dipped into 
their own pockets in order to reduce the delays and hence to achieve their targets – a 
further example of how practical norms operate. For all that, smuggling has continued to 
flourish. Much of it is driven by different regulatory regimes on two sides of a given 
border. In 2016, until it was banned, Ugandan alcohol in sachets formed part of a 
vigorous contraband trade to both Rwanda and Kenya. Again cars that are more than 
eight years old may not be imported into Kenya for safety reasons. In this case, vehicles 
are imported through the port of Mombasa in transit to Uganda from where they double 
back across the border. Although the KRA forbids such untaxed vehicles to pass the 
border during the night, for fear that they will be smuggled, that does not appear to make 
much of an impact on the trafficking in second-hand cars. The Kenyan prohibition on 
the exportation of scrap metal has led to similar consequences. Similarly, there was a 
booming informal trade in Busia in 2018, spurred on by a ban on charcoal burning in 
Kenya. In 2016, a ‘reformed smuggler’ reported that plastic goods from Kenya were 
smuggled into Uganda and that Chinese commodities that were ostensibly destined for 
Uganda found their way back into Kenya.65 The same informant observed that goods 
that are made in Kenya are often sold in Uganda and then smuggled back into Kenya. 
Although this seems to defeat any straightforward economic logic, the answer appears to 
lie in a conjuncture of two factors: the higher costs for wholesalers doing business in 
Kenya and the attraction for smaller traders of purchasing goods in smaller quantities.66  
The inclination of local traders to continue doing things in the accustomed way is 
rooted in a strong sense of being the owners of the  border space – very much as Flynn 
has outlined for the Nigeria-Benin border.67 At Busia, the problem historically was that 
settlements encroached on what was intended to be a no-man’s land. On the Kenya side, 
the decision was taken to knock down the informal settlements, whereas in Uganda the 
place that is known as ‘Sophia’ – named after a prominent female trader – has continued 
to thrive, and indeed hosts a regular market. Sophia is located about 50 meters from the 
OSBP and it is possible on any given day to witness a steady stream of bicycles and 
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motor-bikes carrying goods back and forth. The image that confronts the observer 
standing on the Kenya side could not be more striking: to the left vehicles queue up to 
pass through the OSBP, while to the right the informal and largely illicit trade proceeds 
briskly with very little attempt to control it. Informants noted that the resident population 
fiercely defends its rights to make an income from trade, and that the Police generally 
keep their distance after a number were allegedly killed by smugglers. Marachi, located 
on the other side of the OSBP from Sophia, is reputed to be the place where smuggling 
is conducted by four-wheeled transport and is equally regarded as a no-go zone. More 
generally, the relationship between local residents and the Police has been fraught at a 
number of the border crossings. For example, there have been protests at Gatuna and 
Busia-Kenya over robberies and murders that the Police seemed unwilling or unable to 
solve.68  
The Customs authorities are well-aware of some collusion between large and 
smaller traders. Consignments that are worth less than $2,000 are treated as small-scale 
and are eligible to be handed under the ‘Simplified Certificate’. Large traders in Kenya 
may drive a truck full of goods to the border and then hand them on to small-traders who 
may choose to pass at the official crossing or risk using the panya routes. Once the 
goods arrive on the Ugandan side, they can then be reloaded onto larger vehicles or sold 
in local shops. At Busia, a common sight is that of disabled traders driving wheelchairs, 
which have been converted to transport goods through the OSBP. This is part of a well-
established, but informal arrangement. Customs officers claim that while their disability 
means they have been treated with leniency, some of them work in league with the larger 
traders. It is evident that Customs officers often find it easier to look the other way rather 
than risking a confrontation or pushing more trade onto the panya routes. At Katuna in 
2018, URA officers generally did not stop bicycle traders despite the fact that it was 
common knowledge that they were often making serial journeys on behalf of larger 
traders. The alternative, one official explained, would be ‘riot!’.69  
Because so much of what passes through the border has been held up for periods 
of time, whole livelihoods have grown up around the performance of ‘services’: 
facilitating speed of access to Customs and Immigration for travellers; changing money; 
transporting loads and so on. While the OSBPs are under construction, it is almost 
impossible to prevent people passing in and out of the facilities in a more or less 
unregulated fashion. But it is striking that even once the buildings have been completed, 
local populations still enjoy relatively free access. The people who have gravitated 
towards these spaces of opportunity do so partly out of a sense of entitlement. In their 
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view, they are the owners of the land and have the perfect right to be there. Moreover, 
they receive the backing of local politicians who can readily see that the creation of 
sealed enclaves will impact negatively on their constituents who need to make a living in 
whatever way possible. As things stand, therefore, the presence of unauthorized actors 
within the OSBP is tolerated as a necessary compromise by border officials. In the case 
of Busia-Uganda, the money changers wear yellow cloaks as a sign that they have been 
formally recognized by the URA. But in most cases, money-changers move in and stake 
a claim to the space around the OSBP buildings. Where the OSBPs are completed, they 
host foreign exchange bureaux, but these co-exist with the money-changers rather than 
displacing them. In some respects, therefore, the border authorities are forced to deal 
with demands that are difficult to reconcile: on the one hand, creating a secure facility in 
which the access routes are patrolled and the outer perimeters are secured, and on the 
other creating a user-friendly environment that facilitates local livelihoods. As things 
stand, the managers of the OSBPs apparently feel they can do little to restrict access to 
members of the surrounding community, and it is difficult to believe that this will 
change when the last stretch of road is properly tarred. 
This brings us to the intriguing question of whether OSBPs should be regarded as 
a possible fourth site of border governance. They have been conceived as a rupture with 
the existing pattern of land border crossings. They have been planned as trans-national 
spaces where the physical infrastructure and the electronic procedures transcend national 
framings. At OSBPs like Busia, the facilities are intended to make bold statements – 
about efficiency, transparency, international co-operation and global connectivity. In the 
planning, then, OSBPs resemble airports and seaports. They each handle cargo as well 
as people, but the difference is that seaports and airports are folded in upon themselves. 
Port facilities are designed as enclosed spaces with strictly controlled public access. 
Airports are different in that they are more about human flows, which means that they 
can not be entirely sealed off. Nevertheless, airports are exceptional spaces where 
movement is restricted, behaviour is closely monitored, and to some extent the normal 
rights of citizens are held in suspense - even as their tastes as consumers are gratified. 
OSBPs handle human flows in the same way as airports do. The same forms are filled 
and biometric data is collected in an identical way. The aspiration to render OSBPs 
welcoming spaces is reflected in the building designs, which have reserved space for 
cafeterias and public toilets. Nevertheless, the movement of people is far less regimented 
than at airports.70 Notably, there are large empty spaces where passengers are free to 
move about. But the plans provide only a limited insight into the ways in which OSBPs 
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function. Crucially, the OSBP is also located within a space where local people have a 
strong sense of their rights. Although there is always a security presence, OSBPs have to 
be outward-facing if they are to win local acceptance. No doubt there will be some 
arguments in favour of regulating access more closely when all the OSBPs are complete 
- not least on the part of those charged with security and anti-terrorism responsibilities. 
But OSBP managers are acutely conscious of the fact that they rely on the patronage of 
the resident population and therefore need to maintain an open door. As things stand, 
OSBPs look more like co-produced spaces of engagement than sites of state surveillance 
– and it is this which makes them very unlike airports.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, we have addressed two sets of issues relating to the role of OSBPs in 
border management. The first is their ability to reconfigure institutional patterns, for 
which we have found limited support. The variable manner in which OSBP structures 
have been completed and operationalized has actually reflected the rivalries between 
agencies in each of the countries as much as cross-border synergies. On either side of the 
Kenya-Uganda border, the existence (or not) of a lead agency has led to quite different 
spatial configurations and institutional consequences. Again, the very different patterns 
at Mirama Hills/ Kagitumba and Gatuna/Katuna on the Uganda/Rwanda border point to 
the importance of non-state actors like TMEA in co-ordinating planning and 
implementation. We have also found that where OSBPs have been completed, they have 
enabled agencies to perform their functions more efficaciously. There has been added 
pressure on governmental agencies to align their information technologies and work 
practices. But some of the latter necessarily takes the form of practical workarounds. 
The proliferation of paper and the reliance on face-to-face meetings to resolve recurrent 
issues underlines the extent to which the paperless border remains an aspiration. The 
sharing of electronic data does not replace older bureaucratic practices, but is layered 
across them. Outside the OSBPs, where officials have less incentive to embrace the 
vision of the frictionless corridor, paper documents remain fundamental to the ability of 
drivers to transport their goods. 
Secondly, we have considered how far border management assumes a distinct 
guise at the OSBP. We found that the idea of a productive border crossing, in which 
truckers, travellers and small-scale traders feel invested, comes with significant 
consequences. The language of service is heavily loaded and it is an open question how 
far the ideology of the system is fully internalized. But it does affect the interaction 
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between officials and those who use the OSBPs. The relationship with members of the 
surrounding communities also plays a crucial part in shaping the configuration of space 
and everyday practices within the OSBP. The highly ordered spaces that are depicted on 
the construction plans are recognizable on the ground, but there is much that is the 
product of negotiation. Although the access gates filter travellers and vehicles, there has 
been little attempt to exclude local populations who derive a living from the existence of 
the border and who can rely on the sympathy of local power-brokers. On the contrary, 
officials can only meet their regular targets if more local people patronize the OSBP. 
The concern of managers is to prevent OSBPs from lapsing into the ‘disorderly’ patterns 
that are familiar from other border crossings rather than to create sanitized spaces like 
the modern airport. Where border work is performed therefore matters a great deal. For 
this reason, we conclude that the OSBP does represent an incipient fourth type of site of 
border governance that shares elements with, but is distinct from, conventional land 
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